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, Detroit
Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-In Dangers of the American Automobile by
Ralph Nader, published in
1965, is a book detailing his claims of resistance by car manufacturers to the introduction of
safety features, like
seat belts, and their general reluctance to spend money on improving safety. It was a pioneering work of consumer advocacy, openly polemical but containing substantial references and material from industry insiders. It made Nader a household name and the style is often imitated.
Excessive use of chrome and other bright or glossy automobile finishes
Much criticism was levied on this facet of auto design, as often instrument panels and dashboards were brightly finished with chrome and glossy enamels which often reflected sunlight or the light of oncoming motor vehicles into the driver's eyes. This problem, according to Nader, was well known by persons in the industry, but little was done to correct it. Usually, the excuse for not taking actions was that it would take away from the styling or appearance of the cars. Subsequently, bright and blinding finishes inside motor cars have been greatly reduced or eliminated completely.
Shift Patterns on Early Automatics
Apart from some of the examples given in the better known Corvair chapter, Nader said much about the shift quadrants on early automatic transmission equipped cars. Several examples were given of persons accidentally being run over, or cars that turned into runaways because the driver operating the vehicle at the time of the accident was not familiar with its shift pattern and would shift into reverse when intending to shift to park. Nader makes an appeal to the auto industry to standardize these shift patterns between makes and models as a safety issue.
Early automatic transmissions, including GM's Hydra-Matic, Packard's Ultramatic, and Borg Warner's automatic used by a number of independent manufacturers (
Nash Rambler, Studebaker) used a pattern of "P N D L R" which put Reverse at the bottom of the quadrant, next to Low. Drivers still used to moving the shift lever all the way down for "first gear" on a manual shift, would accidentally select "R" and would unexpectedly move the car backwards. In addition, other manufacturers such as Chrysler, used a push-button selector, which was yet another diverse method of selecting gear ranges. Ford was the first to use the "P R N D L" pattern which separated Reverse from forward ranges by Neutral. Eventually this pattern became the standard for all automatic shift cars.
Chevrolet's
Powerglide, at least as seen on the Corvair, used a "R N D L" pattern which separated the Reverse from the Drive gears by neutral in the ideal way, but which had no "P" selection, relying instead on a separate hand brake when parking.
The Corvair
One of the examples of the book, and the article for which it is probably most widely known although it forms only one chapter, was General Motors Corporation'
Chevrolet Corvair. The 1960–
1963 Corvairs had a rear-engine, and a Swing axle design which was prone to "tuck under" in certain circumstances and which required drivers to maintain proper
tire pressures which were outside of the tire manufacturer's recommended tolerances for the tire and with an unusually high front:rear differential (15psi front, 26psi rear, when cold; 18 psi and 30psi hot). The pressures were more critical than for most contemporaneous designs, but this was not made explicitly clear to salespeople or owners. The pressures also rendered the tires overloaded, according to the standards laid down by the Tire and Rim Association, the relevant industry body, with two or more passengers on board. An unadvertised at-cost option #696 included uprated springs and dampers, front anti-roll bars and rear axle rebound straps to prevent tuck-under. Aftermarket kits were also available, such as the EMPI Camber Compensator, for the knowledgeable owner. The suspension design was modified for the 1964 model year, just far enough ahead of publication to allow its inclusion in the book; most significantly a second, outboard
constant velocity joint was added to maintain a constant camber angle at the wheels. Corvairs from 1965 on were of this type and did not suffer the characteristic tuck-under crashes.
GM responded by both trying to silence Nader with a private investigation and by improving the Corvair's suspension. On
March 22, 1966, GM President James Roche was forced to appear before a United States Senate subcommittee, and to apologize to Nader for the company's campaign of harassment and
intimidation. GM was later successfully sued by Nader.
The Corvair's image was permanently tarnished and
Unsafe is still often characterized as the book "about the Corvair", but this is only one of eight chapters, the theme of tire pressures chosen for comfort not safety is recurrent, and the main theme throughout is the way in which the motor industry evades even well-founded and technically informed criticism.
The book also claims that the road safety mantra called the "three E's" ("Engineering, Enforcement and Education") was created to distract attention from the real problems of vehicle safety, such as the fact that some were sold with tires that could not bear the weight of a fully-loaded vehicle.
The book still has some relevance today: it addressed what Nader perceived as the politics meddling of the car industry to oppose new safety features, and parallels the debates in the 1990's over the mandatory fitting of air bags, in the United States, and industry efforts by the ACEA to delay the introduction of crash tests to assess vehicle front pedestrian protection in the
European Union{{cite paper|title=An Integrated, Market-based approach to vehicle safety in road transport|author=Milton Bertin-Jones|publisher=SAE Technical Paper Nº 2003-01-0104-->.
Criticism
Nader's thesis blames not the swing-axle design
per se but the combination of weight distribution, swing axle with a single, inboard, constant velocity joint, and unusually critical tire pressures. The idea that the Corvair is inherently unsafe is neither universally accepted nor applicable to all model years.
Award-winning U.S. motoring journalist David E. Davis, in an article in Automobile Magazine, draws attention to the fact that although Nader claimed that the use of a swing-axle rear suspension was dangerous, that Porsche, Mercedes-Benz, and Volkswagen all used similar swing-axle concepts during that era.{{cite web],{{cite web|title=Corvair Handling and Stability|publisher=Corvair Corsa|url=http://www.corvaircorsa.com/handling01.html--> the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) ran a series of comparative tests, in 1971, studying the handling of the 1963 Corvair against four contemporary cars, a
Ford Falcon (North America),
Plymouth Valiant,
Volkswagen Beetle, Renault Dauphine and also a later 1967 Corvair (with a revised suspension design) was included for comparison. The account goes on to describe some of the test details, which included a review of national accident data, and a review of GM internal files and documents, and quotes parts of the original NHTSA report{{cite paper|title=PB 211-015: Evaluation of the 1960-1963 Corvair Handling and Stability|date=July 1972|publisher=National Technical Information Service--> conclusion thus:
Peltzman Effect
The impact of the safety regulations that spawned because of the book became the basis of a paper by economist Sam Peltzman. The conclusions of this paper—that the regulations actually caused additional deaths—became known as the
Peltzman Effect. Peltzman argued that because regulation made cars safer, getting into an accident became cheaper (it was less risky) and so it happened more. Driver and passenger deaths changed little after the regulations were in place, but pedestrian deaths increased, probably because there was no improvement to car safety with respect to those outside the vehicle.
Peltzman also argued that car safety was already improving, though at a slow rate, since the invention of the car. These improvements tended to be minor but had a huge impact in improving safety (such as a
rearview mirror mounted on the outside of the car and automatically canceling turn signals).
Further reading
- Unsafe at Any Speed The Designed-In Dangers of The American Automobile (1965 ) Grossman Publishers, New York LC # 65-16856
- Interview With Dr. Jorg Beckmann of the ETSC. "Safety experts and the motor car lobby meet head on in Brussels." TEC, Traffic Engineering and Control, Vol 44 N°7 July/August 2003 Hemming Group ISSN 0041 0683
Notes
External Links
- Podcast discussing the unintended consequences of the safety regulations Sam Peltzman on EconTalk discusses the Peltzman Effect, the roots of which lay in car safety regulation.
, Detroit
Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-In Dangers of the American Automobile by
Ralph Nader, published in 1965, is a book detailing his claims of resistance by
car manufacturers to the introduction of
safety features, like seat belts, and their general reluctance to spend money on improving safety. It was a pioneering work of consumer advocacy, openly polemical but containing substantial references and material from industry insiders. It made Nader a household name and the style is often imitated.
Excessive use of chrome and other bright or glossy automobile finishes
Much criticism was levied on this facet of auto design, as often instrument panels and dashboards were brightly finished with chrome and glossy enamels which often reflected sunlight or the light of oncoming motor vehicles into the driver's eyes. This problem, according to Nader, was well known by persons in the industry, but little was done to correct it. Usually, the excuse for not taking actions was that it would take away from the styling or appearance of the cars. Subsequently, bright and blinding finishes inside motor cars have been greatly reduced or eliminated completely.
Shift Patterns on Early Automatics
Apart from some of the examples given in the better known Corvair chapter, Nader said much about the shift quadrants on early
automatic transmission equipped cars. Several examples were given of persons accidentally being run over, or cars that turned into runaways because the driver operating the vehicle at the time of the accident was not familiar with its shift pattern and would shift into reverse when intending to shift to park. Nader makes an appeal to the auto industry to standardize these shift patterns between makes and models as a safety issue.
Early automatic transmissions, including GM's
Hydra-Matic, Packard's
Ultramatic, and Borg Warner's automatic used by a number of independent manufacturers (
Nash Rambler,
Studebaker) used a pattern of "P N D L R" which put Reverse at the bottom of the quadrant, next to Low. Drivers still used to moving the shift lever all the way down for "first gear" on a manual shift, would accidentally select "R" and would unexpectedly move the car backwards. In addition, other manufacturers such as Chrysler, used a push-button selector, which was yet another diverse method of selecting gear ranges. Ford was the first to use the "P R N D L" pattern which separated Reverse from forward ranges by Neutral. Eventually this pattern became the standard for all automatic shift cars.
Chevrolet's Powerglide, at least as seen on the Corvair, used a "R N D L" pattern which separated the Reverse from the Drive gears by neutral in the ideal way, but which had no "P" selection, relying instead on a separate hand brake when parking.
The Corvair
One of the examples of the book, and the article for which it is probably most widely known although it forms only one chapter, was General Motors Corporation' Chevrolet Corvair. The 1960–
1963 Corvairs had a rear-engine, and a Swing axle design which was prone to "tuck under" in certain circumstances and which required drivers to maintain proper tire pressures which were outside of the tire manufacturer's recommended tolerances for the tire and with an unusually high front:rear differential (15psi front, 26psi rear, when cold; 18 psi and 30psi hot). The pressures were more critical than for most contemporaneous designs, but this was not made explicitly clear to salespeople or owners. The pressures also rendered the tires overloaded, according to the standards laid down by the Tire and Rim Association, the relevant industry body, with two or more passengers on board. An unadvertised at-cost option #696 included uprated springs and dampers, front anti-roll bars and rear axle rebound straps to prevent tuck-under. Aftermarket kits were also available, such as the EMPI Camber Compensator, for the knowledgeable owner. The suspension design was modified for the 1964 model year, just far enough ahead of publication to allow its inclusion in the book; most significantly a second, outboard constant velocity joint was added to maintain a constant
camber angle at the wheels. Corvairs from 1965 on were of this type and did not suffer the characteristic tuck-under crashes.
GM responded by both trying to silence Nader with a private investigation and by improving the Corvair's suspension. On
March 22, 1966, GM President James Roche was forced to appear before a United States Senate subcommittee, and to apologize to Nader for the company's campaign of harassment and intimidation. GM was later successfully sued by Nader.
The Corvair's image was permanently tarnished and
Unsafe is still often characterized as the book "about the Corvair", but this is only one of eight chapters, the theme of tire pressures chosen for comfort not safety is recurrent, and the main theme throughout is the way in which the motor industry evades even well-founded and technically informed criticism.
The book also claims that the road safety mantra called the "three E's" ("Engineering, Enforcement and Education") was created to distract attention from the real problems of vehicle safety, such as the fact that some were sold with tires that could not bear the weight of a fully-loaded vehicle.
The book still has some relevance today: it addressed what Nader perceived as the
politics meddling of the car industry to oppose new safety features, and parallels the debates in the 1990's over the mandatory fitting of
air bags, in the United States, and industry efforts by the ACEA to delay the introduction of crash tests to assess vehicle front pedestrian protection in the European Union{{cite paper|title=An Integrated, Market-based approach to vehicle safety in road transport|author=Milton Bertin-Jones|publisher=SAE Technical Paper Nº 2003-01-0104-->.
Criticism
Nader's thesis blames not the swing-axle design
per se but the combination of weight distribution, swing axle with a single, inboard, constant velocity joint, and unusually critical tire pressures. The idea that the Corvair is inherently unsafe is neither universally accepted nor applicable to all model years.
Award-winning U.S. motoring journalist
David E. Davis, in an article in Automobile Magazine, draws attention to the fact that although Nader claimed that the use of a swing-axle rear suspension was dangerous, that Porsche, Mercedes-Benz, and Volkswagen all used similar swing-axle concepts during that era.{{cite web],{{cite web|title=Corvair Handling and Stability|publisher=Corvair Corsa|url=http://www.corvaircorsa.com/handling01.html--> the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) ran a series of comparative tests, in 1971, studying the handling of the 1963 Corvair against four contemporary cars, a
Ford Falcon (North America),
Plymouth Valiant, Volkswagen Beetle,
Renault Dauphine and also a later 1967 Corvair (with a revised suspension design) was included for comparison. The account goes on to describe some of the test details, which included a review of national accident data, and a review of GM internal files and documents, and quotes parts of the original NHTSA report{{cite paper|title=PB 211-015: Evaluation of the 1960-1963 Corvair Handling and Stability|date=July 1972|publisher=National Technical Information Service--> conclusion thus:
Peltzman Effect
The impact of the safety regulations that spawned because of the book became the basis of a paper by economist Sam Peltzman. The conclusions of this paper—that the regulations actually caused additional deaths—became known as the Peltzman Effect. Peltzman argued that because regulation made cars safer, getting into an accident became cheaper (it was less risky) and so it happened more. Driver and passenger deaths changed little after the regulations were in place, but pedestrian deaths increased, probably because there was no improvement to car safety with respect to those outside the vehicle.
Peltzman also argued that car safety was already improving, though at a slow rate, since the invention of the car. These improvements tended to be minor but had a huge impact in improving safety (such as a rearview mirror mounted on the outside of the car and automatically canceling turn signals).
Further reading
- Unsafe at Any Speed The Designed-In Dangers of The American Automobile (1965 ) Grossman Publishers, New York LC # 65-16856
- Interview With Dr. Jorg Beckmann of the ETSC. "Safety experts and the motor car lobby meet head on in Brussels." TEC, Traffic Engineering and Control, Vol 44 N°7 July/August 2003 Hemming Group ISSN 0041 0683
Notes
External Links
- Podcast discussing the unintended consequences of the safety regulations Sam Peltzman on EconTalk discusses the Peltzman Effect, the roots of which lay in car safety regulation.
ABD - 'Unsafe at any speed'
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Unsafe at Any Speed - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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